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In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a
differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses.
Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the
relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack
can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from
sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the
source unambiguously.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The main security threat of quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols based on weak coherent pulses (WCP)
arises from the fact that some signals contain more than
one photon prepared in the same polarization state. In
this situation, the eavesdropper (Eve) can perform, for
instance, the so-called Photon Number Splitting (PNS)
attack on the multi-photon pulses [1]. As a result, it
turns out that the BB84 protocol [2] with WCP can give
a key generation rate of order O(η2), where η denotes the
transmission efficiency of the quantum channel [3, 4].
To obtain higher secure key rates over longer distances,
different practical QKD schemes, that are robust against
the PNS attack, have been proposed in recent years. One
of these schemes is the so-called decoy-states [5], where
the sender (Alice) randomly varies the mean photon num-
ber of the signal states that are forwarded to the receiver
(Bob). This method can deliver a secure key rate of or-
der O(η). Another possibility is based on the transmis-
sion of two non-orthogonal coherent states together with
a strong reference pulse [6]. This technique also pro-
vides a key generation rate of order O(η) [7]. Finally,
another potential approach is to use a differential-phase-
shift (DPS) QKD protocol [8, 9]. In this scheme, Alice
sends to Bob a train of WCP whose phases are randomly
modulated by 0 or π. On the receiving side, Bob mea-
sures out each incoming signal by means of an interferom-
eter whose path-length difference is set equal to the time
difference between two consecutive pulses. In this last
case, however, a secure key rate of order O(η) has only
been proven so far against a special type of individual
attacks where Eve acts and measures photons individu-
ally, rather than signals [9], and also against a particular
class of collective attacks where Eve attaches ancillary
systems to each pulse or to each pair of successive pulses
sent by Alice [10]. While a complete security proof of
a DPS QKD protocol against the most general attack is
still missing, recently it has been shown that sequential
attacks [9] already impose strong restrictions on the per-
formance of this QKD scheme with WCP. For instance,
in [11, 12, 13] it was proven that the long-distance im-
plementations of DPS QKD reported in [14, 15, 16, 17]
would be insecure against a sequential attack based on
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) of Alice’s signal
states [18, 19, 20].
In this paper, we investigate a novel sequential attack
where Eve realizes unambiguous discrimination of the rel-
ative phases between Alice’s signal states, and we obtain
ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achiev-
able by a DPS QKD scheme as a function of the error
rate in the sifted key, and the mean photon number of
the signals sent by Alice. It states that no key distillation
protocol can provide a secret key from the correlations
established by the users. Moreover, we show that this
attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security
of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from a sequen-
tial attack where Eve performs USD of each signal state
emitted by Alice [11, 12, 13].
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we
describe in more detail a DPS QKD protocol. Then, in
section III, we present a sequential attack against this
QKD scheme based on optimal unambiguous discrimina-
tion of the relative phases between Alice’s signal states.
Here we obtain upper bounds on the performance of a
DPS QKD scheme as a function of the error rate in the
sifted key and the mean photon number of Alice’s signal
states. Finally, section IV concludes the paper with a
summary. The manuscript contains as well one appendix
with additional calculations.
II. DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
The basic setup is illustrated in figure 1. Alice pre-
pares first a train of coherent states |α〉 and, afterwards,
she modulates, at random and independently every time,
the phase of each pulse to be 0 or π. As a result, she pro-
duces a random train of signal states |α〉 or | − α〉 that
are sent to Bob through the quantum channel. On the
receiving side, Bob uses a 50 : 50 beam splitter to divide
the incoming pulses into two possible paths and then he
recombines them again using another 50 : 50 beam split-
ter. The time delay introduced by Bob’s interferometer
is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two consec-
utive pulses. Whenever the relative phase between two
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FIG. 1: Basic setup of a DPS QKD scheme. PM denotes a
phase modulator, BS, a 50 : 50 beam splitter, M, a mirror,
D0 and D1 are two photon detectors and ∆t represents the
time difference between two consecutive pulses.
consecutive signals is 0 (±π) only the photon detector
D0 (D1) may produce a “click” (at least one photon is
detected). For each detected event, Bob records the time
slot where he obtained a click and the actual detector
that fired.
Once the quantum communication phase of the pro-
tocol is completed, Bob uses a classical authenticated
channel to announce the time slots where he obtained a
click, but he does not reveal which detector fired each
time. From this information provided by Bob, together
with the knowledge of the phase value used to modulate
each pulse, Alice can infer which photon detector had
clicked at Bob’s side each given time. Then, Alice and
Bob agree, for instance, to select a bit value “0” when-
ever the photon detector D0 fired, and a bit value “1”
if the detector D1 clicked. In an ideal scenario, Alice
and Bob end up with an identical string of bits repre-
senting the sifted key. Due to the noise introduced by
the quantum channel, together with possible imperfec-
tions of Alice and Bob’s devices, however, the sifted key
typically contains some errors. Then, Alice and Bob per-
form error-correction to reconcile the data and privacy
amplification to decouple the data from Eve. (See, for
instance, [21].)
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS AGAINST
DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
A sequential attack can be seen as a special type of
intercept-resend attack [9, 11, 12, 13]. First, Eve mea-
sures out every signal state emitted by Alice with a de-
tection apparatus located very close to the sender. After-
wards, she transmits each measurement result through a
lossless classical channel to a source close to Bob. When-
ever Eve obtains a predetermined number of consecutive
successful measurement outcomes, this source prepares a
new train of non-vacuum signal states that is forwarded
to Bob. Otherwise, Eve typically sends vacuum signals
to Bob to avoid errors [22]. Whether a measurement
result is considered to be successful or not, and which
type of signal states Eve sends to Bob, depends on Eve’s
particular eavesdropping strategy and on her measure-
ment device. Sequential attacks transform the original
quantum channel between Alice and Bob into an entan-
glement breaking channel [23] and, therefore, they do not
allow the distribution of quantum correlations needed to
establish a secret key [24].
The first sequential attack against a DPS QKD proto-
col was introduced very briefly in [9]. In this proposal,
Eve employs a detection apparatus equivalent to Bob’s
setup. A successful result is associated with Eve obtain-
ing a click in her measurement device. This click identi-
fies unambiguously the relative phase (0 or ±π) between
two consecutive pulses emitted by Alice and, therefore, it
reveals Eve the bit value encoded by the sender. A fail-
ure corresponds to the absence of a click. However, since
Alice emits WCP with typical average photon number
quite low, so is the probability that Eve obtains a suc-
cessful result in this scenario. In order to increase Eve’s
successful probability other sequential attacks have been
proposed more recently [11, 12, 13]. These attacks are
typically based on Eve realizing USD of each signal state
emitted by Alice, since Eve can always access a local os-
cillator that is phase-locked to the coherent light source
employed by the sender [13]. In particular, when Eve
identifies unambiguously a signal state emitted by Alice,
i.e., she determines without error whether it is |α〉 or
| − α〉, then she considers this result as successful. Oth-
erwise, she considers it a failure. In [11] it was shown
that this class of sequential attacks can provide tighter
upper bounds on the performance of a DPS QKD pro-
tocol than those derived from a sequential attack where
Eve uses the same measurement apparatus like Bob.
In this section, we introduce an improved version of
the sequential attack proposed in [9], and we investigate
again the situation where Eve tries to identify the rela-
tive phases between Alice’s signal states unambiguously.
As a result, it turns out that the attack we propose can
provide stronger limitations for the security of a DPS
QKD scheme than those reported in [11, 12, 13]. In our
analysis we consider a conservative definition of security,
i.e., we assume that Eve can always control some flaws in
Alice’s and Bob’s devices (e.g., the detection efficiency,
the dark count probability and the dead-time of the de-
tectors), together with the losses in the channel, and she
exploits them to obtain maximal information about the
shared key.
A. Optimal unambiguous discrimination between
relative phases
In a DPS QKD protocol Alice sends to Bob a train of
WCP each of them prepared in the state |α〉 or | − α〉.
These coherent states can be expressed in some orthogo-
nal basis {|0〉, |1〉} as follows
| ± α〉 = a|0〉 ± b|1〉, (1)
3where we assume, without loss of generality, that the
coefficients a and b are given by
a =
√
1
2
[1 + exp (−2µα)],
b =
√
1
2
[1− exp (−2µα)], (2)
with µα = |α|2 denoting the mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states. That is, a and b satisfy: a ∈ R,
b ∈ R, a2 + b2 = 1, and a > b when µα 6= 0.
The state of a block of M consecutive WCP emitted
by Alice, that we shall denote as |ψ(~xM )〉, can be written
as
|ψ(~xM )〉 =
M⊗
i=1
|(−1)xiα〉 =
1∑
n1,...,nM=0
(−1)
P
M
i=1 xini
× aM−
P
M
i=1
nib
P
M
i=1
ni |n1, ..., nM 〉, (3)
with the coefficients a and b given by (2), and where
the vector ~xM = (x1, ..., xM ), with xi ∈ {0, 1}, contains
the information about the value of the phase (0 or π)
imprinted by Alice in each pulse within the block.
In order to access to the relative phase information
encoded in a block of signals sent by Alice, however, it
is not necessary to completely identify the vector ~xM .
For instance, the relative phase between pulse N and
pulse N − 1 in |ψ(~xM )〉, with 2 ≤ N ≤ M , is simply
given by 0 (±π) when xN ⊕ xN−1 = 0 (1). In general,
for any given state |ψ(~xM )〉, there exists always another
state |ψ(~xM ⊕ ~1M )〉, with ~xM ⊕ ~1M = (x1 ⊕ 1, ..., xM ⊕
1), that has precisely the same M − 1 relative phases as
|ψ(~xM )〉. This means, in particular, that the problem
of determining the relative phases of Alice’s signal states
can be formulated as a discrimination problem between
2M−1 mixed states given by
ρ(~xM ) =
1
2
(
|ψ(~xM )〉〈ψ(~xM )|
+ |ψ(~xM ⊕ ~1M )〉〈ψ(~xM ⊕ ~1M )|
)
, (4)
with the coefficient xM = 0. That is, the vector ~xM has
now the form
~xM = (x1, ..., xM−1, 0), (5)
with xi ∈ {0, 1}. This last condition arises because
ρ(~xM ) satisfies ρ(x1, ..., xM−1, 0) = ρ(x1 ⊕ 1, ..., xM−1 ⊕
1, 1). The normalization term 12 that appears in (4) is
due to the fact that all the states |ψ(~xM )〉 have equal a
priori probabilities.
To distinguish between the signals states given by (4),
we shall consider that Eve follows a USD strategy. That
is, the constraint is that the measurement employed by
Eve should never wrongly identify a state ρ(~xM ), but it
can provide sometimes an inconclusive result [18, 19, 20].
The goal is to keep the fraction of inconclusive outcomes
as low as possible.
Let the set of binary vectors Vy,M , with y ∈
{A,B}, be defined as Vy,M = {(n1, ..., nM ) |
ni ∈ {0, 1}, and
∑M
i=1 ni even if y = A, odd if y = B},
and let YM denote the subspace spanned by the orthog-
onal states {|n1, ..., nM 〉}, with the vectors (n1, ..., nM ) ∈
Vy,M . The signal states ρ(~xM ) given by (4) can be writ-
ten in a block-diagonal form as
ρ(~xM ) =
∑
y∈{A,B}
py,M |ψy(~xM )〉〈ψy(~xM )|, (6)
where the probabilities py,M are given by
py,M =
1∑
n1,...,nM=0
~nM∈Vy,M
(
aM−
P
M
i=1 nib
P
M
i=1 ni
)2
, (7)
with the vector ~nM ≡ (n1, ..., nM ), and where the states
|ψy(~xM )〉 have the form
|ψy(~xM )〉 = 1√
py,M
1∑
n1,...,nM=0
~nM∈Vy,M
(−1)
PM−1
i=1
xini
× aM−
PM
i=1
nib
PM
i=1
ni |n1, ..., nM 〉. (8)
That is, the signals |ψy(~xM )〉 ∈ YM.
This means, in particular, that we can always assume,
without loss of generality, that Eve’s measurement strat-
egy includes an initial step which projects the mixed
states ρ(~xM ) onto the orthogonal subspacesAM and BM.
This projective measurement is characterized by the fol-
lowing two operators:
Πy,M =
1∑
n1,...,nM=0
~nM∈Vy,M
|n1, ..., nM 〉〈n1, ..., nM |, (9)
with y ∈ {A,B}. It satisfies the condi-
tion [Tr(Πy,Mρ(~xM ))]
−1Πy,Mρ(~xM )Π
†
y,M =
|ψy(~xM )〉〈ψy(~xM )|. That is, it outputs the state
|ψy(~xM )〉 with probability py,M .
The question of discriminating the 2M−1 mixed states
given by (4) can then be reduced to the problem of dis-
tinguishing 2M−1 pure states |ψy(~xM )〉. To discriminate
between the signals |ψy(~xM )〉, we shall consider a mea-
surement strategy which can involve at mostM−1 steps.
Before providing the exact details of the measurement, let
us sketch very briefly its principal parts. Eve starts by
performing a filter operation on |ψy(~xM )〉. If the filter
operation succeeds, Eve obtains xM−1 ⊕ xM . That is,
Eve learns with certainty the relative phase between the
first two pulses in the block. Moreover, this filter oper-
ation also outputs a quantum state which still contains
complete information about the remainingM−2 relative
phases within the block. On the contrary, if the filter op-
eration fails, the value of xM−1 is not accessible anymore,
4and Eve cannot obtain the first two relative phases (i.e.,
xM−1⊕xM , and xM−2⊕xM−1) within the block. In this
last case, however, the filter operation outputs a state
which contains information about the remaining M − 3
relative phases within the block. Eve repeats the same
procedure several times, but now applied to the quan-
tum state provided by the filter operation in the previ-
ous step. To gain full information about all the relative
phases contained in |ψy,M (~x)〉, Eve needs to obtainM−1
consecutive successful filtering results.
The main motivation to select such a particular im-
plementation of a USD measurement is closely related to
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy, which will be introduced in
section III B. The principal idea behind this method is
that, with some finite probability, Eve can always deter-
mine the value of some relative phases in |ψy(~xM )〉, even
if she is not able to identify all of them. Moreover, as we
show in A, it turns out that this measurement strategy
is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability of obtaining
an inconclusive result when distinguishing all the M − 1
relative phases of Alice’s signal states. Next, we provide
the technical details of Eve’s measurement.
The set of M − 1 possible filter operations employed
by Eve is defined by the following two Kraus operators:
Fsucc,y,N = Gy,N−1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ IN−1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|, (10)
Ffail,y,N = (IN−1 −G†y,N−1Gy,N−1)1/2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|,
with 2 ≤ N ≤ M , and where IN−1 denotes the identity
operator in H2N−1 , and the operator Gy,N−1 is given by
Gy,N−1 =
1∑
n1,...,nN−1=0
~nN−1∈Vy,N−1
(
b
a
)2(nN−1⊕1)
(11)
× |n1, n2, ..., nN−1 ⊕ 1〉〈n1, n2, ..., nN−1|.
Let |φy(~xN )〉 denote a quantum state of the form
|φy(~xN )〉 = 1√
py,N
1∑
n1,...,nN=0
~nN∈Vy,N
(−1)
PN−1
i=1
(xi⊕xN )ni
× aN−
PN
i=1
nib
PN
i=1
ni |n1, ..., nN〉, (12)
with 1 ≤ N ≤ M . That is, when N = M these states
satisfy |φy(~xM )〉 = |ψy(~xM )〉 for all ~xM given by (5). Let
~xN−1 denote the vector that is formed by the first N − 1
elements of ~xM . For any N satisfying 2 ≤ N ≤ M , the
signal states given by (12) can be written as a function
of |φy(~xN−1)〉 and |φy¯(~xN−1)〉, with y¯ = B when y = A
and y¯ = A when y = B, as
|φy(~xN )〉 = 1√
py,N
(
a
√
py,N−1|φy(~xN−1)〉|0〉 (13)
+ (−1)xN−1⊕xN b√py¯,N−1|φy¯(~xN−1)〉|1〉
)
,
up to a global phase.
Suppose now that the filter operation defined by (10)
receives as input the state |ψy(~xM )〉 ≡ |φy(~xM )〉. The
probability of getting a successful result, that we shall
represent as psucc,y,M , can be calculated as psucc,y,M =
〈φy(~xM )|F †succ,y,MFsucc,y,M |φy(~xM )〉. This quantity is
given by psucc,y,M = (py,M )
−12b2py¯,M−1. If the filter op-
eration succeeded, the resulting normalized filtered state,
that we shall denote as |φsucc,y(~xM )〉, can be calculated
as |φsucc,y(~xM )〉 = (√psucc,y,M )−1Fsucc,y,M |φy(~xM )〉.
We obtain |φsucc,y(~xM )〉 = |φy¯(~xM−1)〉 ⊗ |ψy,M 〉, with
the state |ψy,M 〉 given by |ψy,M 〉 = (
√
2)−1[|0〉 +
(−1)xM−1⊕xM |1〉], up to a global phase. That is, the rel-
ative phase between pulse M and pulse M − 1 is now
completely accessible to Eve. She only has to mea-
sure the state |ψy,M 〉 in the orthogonal basis |±〉 =
(
√
2)−1(|0〉 ± |1〉) to learn its value.
On the contrary, the probability of obtaining a fail-
ure, that we shall denote as pfail,y,M , can be calcu-
lated as pfail,y,M = 〈φy(~xM )|F †fail,y,MFfail,y,M |φy(~xM )〉.
This quantity is given by pfail,y,M = (py,M )
−1(1 −
2b2)py,M−2 = 1 − psucc,y,M . Whenever the filter oper-
ation failed, the resulting normalized filtered state, that
we shall denote as |φfail,y(~xM )〉, can be calculated as
|φfail,y(~xM )〉 = (√pfail,y,M )−1Ffail,y,M |φy(~xM )〉. We
obtain |φfail,y(~xM )〉 = |φy(~xM−2)〉 ⊗ |00〉, up to a global
phase. That is, if Eve fails when filtering the state
|φy(~xM )〉, then the value of xM−1 is not accessible to
her anymore, and Eve cannot obtain the relative phase
information between pulse M and pulse M − 1, and also
between pulse M − 1 and pulse M − 2, within the block.
Once the first filter operation finished, Eve is left with
a quantum state which contains the signal |φy¯(~xM−1)〉 if
the filter succeeded, or the signal |φy(~xM−2)〉 if it failed.
Then, she can repeat the same procedure again, and filter
these signal states to try to obtain xM−2 ⊕ xM−1 if the
original state was |φy¯(~xM−1)〉, or xM−3 ⊕ xM−2 if it was
|φy(~xM−2)〉. In general, whenever a filter operation given
by (10) receives as input the state |φy(~xN )〉, with 2 ≤
N ≤M , then the probability of getting a successful result
is given by
psucc,y,N = 2b
2 py¯,N−1
py,N
. (14)
If the filter operation succeeded, the resulting normalized
filtered state has the form
|φsucc,y(~xN )〉 = |φy¯(~xN−1)〉 ⊗ |ψy,N〉, (15)
with the signal |ψy,N〉 given by
|ψy,N 〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉+ (−1)xN−1⊕xN |1〉
]
, (16)
up to a global phase. On the contrary, the probability of
obtaining a failure can be expressed as
pfail,y,N = (1− 2b2)py,N−2
py,N
, (17)
5with the probabilities pA,0 ≡ 1 and pB,0 ≡ 0. In this last
case, the resulting normalized filtered state is given by
|φfail,y(~xN )〉 = |φy(~xN−2)〉 ⊗ |00〉, (18)
up to a global phase.
Let us now calculate the probability that Eve learns
the first k ∈ [1,M − 1] relative phases of ρ(~xM ). As we
have seen above, to obtain the relative phase between
pulse N and pulse N − 1 within a block of M signals
sent by Alice, Eve has to successfully filter a state of
the form |φy(~xN )〉. Let psucc,N denote the probability
that Eve obtains the value of xN−1 ⊕ xN conditioned on
the fact that Eve has access to a signal |φy(~xN )〉, with
y ∈ {A,B}. This probability can be written as
psucc,N =
∑
y∈{A,B}
pyNpsucc,y,N , (19)
where pyN represents the probability that the state fil-
tered by Eve when trying to obtain xN−1 ⊕ xN belongs
to the subspace YN . When N = M , we have that
pyM is simply given by p
y
M = py,M , with py,M of the
form (7). This means, in particular, that psucc,M =
2b2(py,M−1+ py¯,M−1) = 2b
2, since py,M−1+ py¯,M−1 = 1.
If N = M − 1, the probabilities pyM−1 can be expressed
as pyM−1 = (psucc,M )
−1py¯Mpsucc,y¯,M . Using (14), together
with the fact that psucc,M = 2b
2 and py¯M = py¯,M , we
obtain pyM−1 = py,M−1. That is, psucc,M−1 is given
by psucc,M−1 = 2b
2(py,M−2 + py¯,M−2) = 2b
2. Simi-
larly, when 2 ≤ N ≤ M − 2, the state |φy(~xN )〉 can
only arise from a filter operation on a signal |φy¯(~xN+1)〉
that succeeded, or from a filter operation on a signal
|φy(~xN+2)〉 that failed. If it comes from a successful
filter operation on |φy¯(~xN+1)〉, then pyN can be writ-
ten as pyN = (psucc,N+1)
−1py¯N+1psucc,y¯,N+1. Starting
with the case N = M − 2, we already showed that
psucc,M−1 = 2b
2 and py¯M−1 = py¯,M−1. This means,
therefore, that pyM−2 = py,M−2. If the state |φy(~xN )〉
arises from a filter operation on |φy(~xN+2)〉 which failed,
then pyN is given by p
y
N = (pfail,N+2)
−1pyN+2pfail,y,N+2.
Starting again with the case N =M − 2, and using (17)
together with the fact that pfail,M = 1−psucc,M = 1−2b2
and pyM = py,M , we have that p
y
M−2 = py,M−2 also in this
scenario. Finally, from (19) we obtain that psucc,M−2 sat-
isfies psucc,M−2 = 2b
2. Following a recursive argumenta-
tion, it is straightforward to show that
psucc,N = 2b
2 = 1− exp (−2µα), (20)
for all N satisfying 2 ≤ N ≤ M , and where in the last
equality we have used (2). This means, in particular, that
the probability that Eve learns the first k ∈ [1,M − 1]
relative phases of ρ(~xM ) can now be expressed as
k−1∏
i=0
psucc,M−i = [1− exp (−2µα)]k, (21)
As already mentioned before, it can be proven that this
measurement is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability
of having an inconclusive result when distinguishing all
the relative phases of Alice’s signal states. (See Appendix
A.)
B. Eavesdropping strategy
For simplicity, we shall consider that Eve treats all the
signal states sent by Alice as a single block of signals,
and she tries to discriminate each relative phase within
the block. Whenever she identifies unambiguously a pre-
determined number of consecutive relative phases sent
by Alice, i.e., she determines without error whether each
relative phase is 0 or ±π, she considers this sequence of
measurement outcomes successful. Otherwise she con-
siders it a failure. We define the integer parameter Mmin
as the minimum number of consecutive relative phases
that Eve needs to correctly identify in order to consider
the sequence of measurement outcomes successful. More
precisely, if k ≥ 0 denotes the total number of consecu-
tive relative phases unambiguously identified by Eve be-
fore she obtains an inconclusive result, then, whenever
k > Mmin, Eve prepares a new train of signal states that
is forwarded to Bob. On the other hand, if k < Mmin Eve
sends to Bob k+2 vacuum states, where the last vacuum
state corresponds to Eve’s inconclusive result. Finally,
whenever k = Mmin we shall consider that Eve employs
a probabilistic strategy that combines the two previous
ones. In particular, we assume that Eve sends to Bob a
new train of signal states with probability q and, with
probability 1 − q, she sends to Bob Mmin + 2 vacuum
states. That is, the parameter q allows Eve to smoothly
fit her eavesdropping strategy to the observed data [11].
Moreover, for simplicity, we define the integer param-
eter Mmax > Mmin as the maximum number of consec-
utive unambiguous discrimination successful results that
Eve can obtain in order to send to Bob a train of sig-
nal states. That is, whenever Eve determines unambigu-
ously Mmax consecutive relative phases within a block
of them then she discards the next two phases, sends to
Bob a train of signal states, and begins again the mea-
surement process of the remaining phases. The reason to
discard two consecutive relative phases in this scenario is
just to guarantee that between any two blocks of signal
states sent by Eve there always exists, at least, one vac-
uum state. Specifically, suppose, for instance, that after
Mmax successful results, Eve’s filter operation outputs,
with probability pyN , a state |φy(~xN )〉 given by (12). For
N > 2, the state |φy(~xN )〉 can be written as
|φy(~xN )〉 = 1√
py,N
{√
py,N−2|φy(~xN−2)〉
[
a2|00〉C
+ (−1)xN−1⊕xN b2|11〉C
]
+ ab
√
py¯,N−2
× |φy¯(~xN−2)〉
[
(−1)xN−2⊕xN |01〉C
+ (−1)xN−2⊕xN−1|10〉C
]}
, (22)
up to a global phase. If now Eve discards subsys-
6tem C, the resulting signal state can be expressed as∑
y∈{A,B} p
y
NTrC(|φy(~xN )〉〈φy(~xN )|). After some calcu-
lations, and using the fact that pyN = py,N (see Section
IIIA), we obtain that this state is of the form given by
(6), with M = N − 2. That is, the value of xN−1 is not
accessible anymore, but Eve can start again her measure-
ment strategy on ρ(~xN−2).
Let us now introduce the type of signal states that Eve
forwards to Bob when she obtains Mmin ≤ k ≤ Mmax
consecutive successful measurement outcomes. To guar-
antee that Eve’s presence remains unnoticeable to the
legitimate users, she needs to select these signal states
such that they can reproduce the statistics expected by
the legitimate users after their measurements. For this,
we shall consider the standard version of a DPS QKD
protocol, where Alice and Bob only monitor the raw bit
rate (before the key distillation phase) together with the
time instances in which Bob obtains a click. It was shown
in [13] that the main limitation on the class of signal
states that Eve can send to Bob in this scenario arises
from the dead-time of Bobs detectors. In particular, to
be able to mimic the expected dead-time of the detec-
tors, Eve has to select trains of signal states that can
produce only one click on Bob’s side within a dead-time
period [25]. To achieve this goal, we shall assume that
whenever Eve identifies k consecutive relative phases en-
coded by Alice then she chooses her signal states, that
we denote as |ψke 〉, containing only one photon distributed
among k + 1 temporal modes. These modes correspond
to k + 1 consecutive pulses sent by Alice, i.e., the time
difference between any two consecutive temporal modes
is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two con-
secutive pulses. Specifically, we shall consider that the
states |ψke 〉 are given by [12, 13]
|ψke 〉 =
k+1∑
n=1
A(k)n exp (iθn)aˆ
†
n|vac〉, (23)
with the coefficients A
(k)
n ∈ C and where the normal-
ization condition
∑k+1
n=1 |A(k)n |2 = 1 is always satisfied.
The angles θn are selected such that they reproduce
the relative phases identified by Eve’s measurement, i.e.,
θn − θn−1, with 1 < n ≤ k + 1, is equal to the relative
phase between pulse n and pulse n−1 sent by Alice. The
operator aˆ†n represents a creation operator for one pho-
ton in temporal mode n, and the state |vac〉 refers to the
vacuum state. The superscript k labeling the coefficients
A
(k)
n emphasizes the fact that the value of these coef-
ficients may depend on the number of temporal modes
contained in |ψke 〉.
Eve also appends some vacuum states to each signal
|ψke 〉. The main idea behind this procedure is to guaran-
tee that whenever Bob obtains a click on his detection
apparatus, then he cannot obtain any other click after-
wards during a period of time at least equal to the dead-
time of his detectors. The minimum number of vacuum
states that Eve needs to send to Bob after each signal
|ψke 〉 is given by 1+ d, with d = ⌈tdfc⌉, and where td and
|ψ  〉
e
k1+d vacuum{ {A)
... ...
p  (k)
s
     M       ≤ k  ≤  M     min max
k+2 vacuum{B)
...
p  (k)
v
          0   ≤  k  ≤  M     min
FIG. 2: Possible signal states that Eve sends to Bob together
with their a priori probabilities. The arrow indicates the
transmission direction.
fc denote, respectively, the dead-time of Bob’s detectors
and the clock frequency of the system [13]. The mini-
mum value of d arises from the case where Bob obtains a
click in the last possible temporal mode. Whenever Eve
forwards to Bob a state |ψke 〉 together with 1+ d vacuum
states then she also has to discard some extra relative
phases of |φy(~xN )〉 according to the procedure explained
above before she begins again with her measurement of
the remaining relative phases within the block.
In section IIIA we showed that, given ρ(~xM ), the prob-
ability that Eve learns the first k ∈ [1,M − 1] relative
phases of ρ(~xM ) is given by p
k with
p = 1− exp (−2µα). (24)
This means, in particular, that the probability that Eve
sends to Bob a train of signal states |ψke 〉, together with
1 + d vacuum states, is given by
ps(k) =


qpMmin(1− p) if k = Mmin
pk(1− p) if Mmin < k < Mmax
pMmax if k = Mmax
0 otherwise,
(25)
with p given by (24). Similarly, we shall denote with
pv(k) the probability that Eve sends to Bob k+2 vacuum
states. This probability is given by
pv(k) =


pk(1− p) if 0 ≤ k < Mmin
(1− q)pMmin(1 − p) if k = Mmin
0 otherwise.
(26)
We illustrate all these possible cases in figure 2, where
we also include the different a priori probabilities to be
in each of these scenarios.
Next, we obtain an expression for the gain, i.e., the
probability that Bob obtains a click per signal state
sent by Alice, together with the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) introduced by Eve with this sequential attack.
The analysis is analogous to that included in [13], but
now taking into account the a priori probabilities ps(k)
and pv(k) given by (25) and (26), respectively.
7C. Gain
The gain, that we shall denote as G, can be expressed
as G = Nclicks/Ns, where Nclicks represents the average
total number of clicks obtained by Bob, and Ns is the to-
tal number of signal states sent by Alice. The parameter
Nclicks can be expressed as Nclicks = (Ns/N
e)N eclicks, with
N e denoting the average total number of pulses of the sig-
nal states sent by Eve (see figure 2), and where N eclicks
represents the average total number of clicks obtained by
Bob when Eve sends to him precisely these signal states.
With this notation, the gain of a sequential attack can
be written as
G =
N eclicks
N e
. (27)
Let us start by calculatingN eclicks. Whenever Eve sends
to Bob a signal state |ψke 〉 followed by 1+d vacuum states
(Case A in figure 2) Bob always obtains one click in his
detection apparatus. On the other hand, if Eve sends to
Bob only vacuum states (Case B in figure 2) Bob never
obtains a click. This means, in particular, that N eclicks
can be expressed as
N eclicks =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ps(k) = p
Mmin(p+ q − pq). (28)
The analysis to obtain N e is similar. A signal state |ψke 〉
followed by 1+d vacuum states can be seen as containing
k+2+d pulses. On the other hand, the number of vacuum
pulses alone that Eve sends to Bob can vary from 2 to
Mmin+2 (see figure 2). Adding all these terms together,
and taking into account their a priori probabilities, we
obtain that N e can be written as
N e =
Mmax∑
k=0
pv(k)(k + 2) + ps(k)(k + 2 + d)
=
2− p− pMmax+1
1− p + dN
e
clicks, (29)
with N eclicks given by (28).
The gain G can be related with a transmission distance
l for a given QKD scheme, i.e., a distance which provides
an expected click rate at Bob’s side given by G. This last
condition can be written as
G = 1− exp (−µαηdetηt), (30)
where ηdet represents the detection efficiency of Bob’s de-
tectors, and ηt denotes the transmittivity of the quantum
channel. In the case of a DPS QKD scheme, the value of
ηt can be derived from the loss coefficient γ of the opti-
cal fiber measured in dB/km, the transmission distance
l measured in km, and the loss in Bob’s interferometer L
measured in dB as
ηt = 10
−γl+L
10 . (31)
From (30) and (31), we find that the transmission dis-
tance l that provides a gain G is given by
l = − 1
γ
[
L+ 10log10
(− ln (1−G)
µαηdet
)]
. (32)
D. Quantum bit error rate
The QBER, that we shall denote as Q, is defined as
Q = Nerrors/Nclicks, where Nerrors represents the average
total number of errors obtained by Bob, and Nclicks is
again the average total number of clicks at Bob’s side.
The parameter Nerrors can be expressed as Nerrors =
(Ns/N
e)N eerrors, with N
e
errors denoting the average total
number of errors obtained by Bob when Eve sends him
the different signal states considered in her strategy (see
figure 2). With this notation, and using again the fact
that Nclicks = (Ns/N
e)N eclicks, we obtain that the QBER
of a sequential attack can be expressed as
Q =
N eerrors
N eclicks
. (33)
The parameter N eclicks was calculated in the previous sec-
tion and it is given by (28). In order to obtain an expres-
sion for N eerrors, one can distinguish the same cases like
in the previous section, depending on the type of signal
states that Eve sends to Bob. Whenever Eve sends to
Bob a signal state |ψke 〉 followed by 1 + d vacuum states
(Case A in figure 2), the average total number of errors
in this scenario, that we shall denote as e(k), is given by
e(k) =
1
2
(
1−
k∑
n=1
|A(k)n+1A(k)n |
)
. (34)
On the other hand, if Eve sends to Bob only vacuum
states (Case B in figure 2) Bob never obtains an error.
This means, in particular, that N eerrors can be expressed
as
N eerrors =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ps(k)e(k). (35)
E. Evaluation
The sequential attack introduced in section III B can
be parametrized by the minimum number Mmin of con-
secutive unambiguous discrimination successful results
that Eve needs to obtain in order to consider the se-
quence of measurement outcomes successful, the maxi-
mum number Mmax of consecutive successful results that
Eve can obtain in order to send to Bob a train of signal
states, the value of the probability q, i.e., the probabil-
ity that Eve actually decides to send to Bob the signal
state |ψMmine 〉 followed by 1 + d vacuum states instead
of Mmin + 2 vacuum states, and the state coefficients
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FIG. 3: Gain (G) versus QBER in the sequential attack in-
troduced in section IIIB for the optimal distribution of the
state coefficients A
(k)
n (solid line). The dashed line represents
a sequential USD attack [13]. The mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 500.
The triangles represent experimental data from [17].
A
(k)
n ∈ C that characterize the signal states |ψke 〉, with
Mmin ≤ k ≤Mmax.
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show a graphical representation
of the gain versus the QBER in this sequential attack for
different values of the mean photon number µα of Alice’s
signal states, and the parameter d. It states that no key
distillation protocol can provide a secret key from the
correlations established by the users above the curves,
i.e., the secret key rate in that region is zero. In these
examples we consider the optimal distribution for the
state coefficients A
(k)
n , i.e., the one which provides the
lowest QBER for a given value of the gain. This dis-
tribution was obtained in [13], where it was shown that
the vector of optimal state coefficients (A
(k)
1 , ..., A
(k)
k+1) co-
incides with the normalized eigenvector associated with
the maximal eigenvalue of a (k+1)× (k+1) matrix with
ones only on the first off-diagonals and zeros elsewhere.
These figures assume that Mmax is fixed and given by
Mmax = 25, and we vary the parameters Mmin < Mmax
and q ∈ [0, 1]. These examples also include the case of a
sequential attack where Eve realizes USD of each signal
state sent by Alice [13], together with experimental data
from [14, 15, 16, 17]. For instance, in the experiment re-
ported in [17] the dead-time of Bob’s detectors is td = 50
ns and the clock frequency of the system is fc = 10
GHz. We obtain, therefore, that d = ⌈tdfc⌉ = 500.
(See figure 3.) Similarly, in the experiments realized in
[14, 15, 16] we have that td = 50 ns and fc = 1 GHz.
This means, in particular, that in all these cases d = 50.
(See figures 4, 5 and 6.)
According to these results, we find that the sequential
attack proposed in section III B can provide tighter up-
per bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than
those derived from a sequential attack where Eve per-
forms USD of each signal state emitted by the source.
Basically, this result arises due to the different a priori
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FIG. 4: Gain (G) versus QBER in the sequential attack in-
troduced in section IIIB for the optimal distribution of the
state coefficients A
(k)
n (solid line). The dashed line represents
a sequential USD attack [13]. The mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.17, and the parameter d = 50.
The triangles represent experimental data from [14]. (See also
[16].)
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FIG. 5: Gain (G) versus QBER in the sequential attack in-
troduced in section IIIB for the optimal distribution of the
state coefficients A
(k)
n (solid line). The dashed line represents
a sequential USD attack [13]. The mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.16, and the parameter d = 50.
The triangle represents experimental data from [14]. (See also
[16].)
probabilities of Eve sending to Bob a train of signal states
|ψke 〉, together with 1+ d vacuum states, in each of these
two possible attacks. In particular, while in the attack
introduced in section III B these probabilities are given
by ps(k), in a sequential USD attack these probabilities
have the form ps(k)p, with p given by (24). Note that in
this last case Eve has to discriminate the state of k + 1
consecutive signals sent by Alice unambiguously.
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FIG. 6: Gain (G) versus QBER in the sequential attack in-
troduced in section IIIB for the optimal distribution of the
state coefficients A
(k)
n (solid line). The dashed line represents
a sequential USD attack [13]. The mean photon number of
Alice’s signal states is µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 50.
The triangles represent experimental data from [15]. (See also
[16].)
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed limitations imposed by
sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-
phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocol based on weak coherent pulses. A sequential attack
consists of Eve measuring out every coherent state emit-
ted by Alice and, afterwards, she prepares new signal
states, depending on the results obtained, that are given
to Bob. Whenever Eve obtains a predetermined number
of consecutive successful measurement outcomes, then
she prepares a new train of non-vacuum signal states that
is forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve can send vacuum
signals to Bob to avoid errors. Sequential attacks trans-
form the original quantum channel between Alice and
Bob into an entanglement breaking channel and, there-
fore, they do not allow the distribution of quantum cor-
relations needed to establish a secret key.
Specifically, we have investigated a sequential attack
where Eve realizes optimal unambiguous discrimination
of the relative phases between Alice’s signal states. When
Eve identifies unambiguously the relative phase between
two consecutive signal states sent by Alice, then she con-
siders this result as successful. Otherwise, she considers
it a failure. As a result, we obtained ultimate upper
bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS
QKD scheme as a function of the error rate in the sifted
key, and the mean photon number of Alice’s signals. It
states that there exists no improved classical communi-
cation protocol or improved security analysis which can
turn the correlations established by the users into a secret
key. Moreover, our analysis indicates that this attack can
provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS
QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks
where Eve performs unambiguous state discrimination of
each signal state emitted by the source.
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APPENDIX A: OPTIMALITY OF EVE’S
MEASUREMENT
In this appendix we show that the unambiguous dis-
crimination measurement presented in section III A is
optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability of having an
inconclusive result when distinguishing all the relative
phases between Alice’s signal states. For that, we calcu-
late the maximal probability of unambiguously determin-
ing all the relative phases contained in the signal states
ρ(~xM ) given by (6), and we show that this probability
coincides with that provided by the measurement intro-
duced in section IIIA.
As already mentioned before, due to the special block
structure of the signal states ρ(~xM ), we can always as-
sume, without loss of generality, that Eve first projects
ρ(~xM ) onto the orthogonal subspaces AM and BM and,
afterwards, she measures the relative phase information
contained in |ψy(~xM )〉, with y ∈ {A,B}.
The set of states |ψy(~xM )〉 ∈ YM constitutes a so-
called geometrically uniform (GU) set [26, 27]. That is,
these states are defined over a group of unitary matrices
and they can be generated by a single generating vector.
In particular, let G be the finite group of 2M−1 unitary
matrices U(~xM ) defined as
U(~xM ) =
1∑
n1,...,nM=0
(−1)
PM−1
i=1
xini |n1, ..., nM 〉
× 〈n1, ..., nM |, (A1)
with ~xM given by (5). If we denote as ~0M = (01, ..., 0M )
the vector that has all itsM elements equal to zero, then
the states |ψy(~xM )〉 can always be written as |ψy(~xM )〉 =
U(~xM )|ψy(~0M )〉, with |ψy(~0M )〉 being the generating vec-
tor of the set.
Let Φy,M denote the matrix whose columns are the
state vectors |ψy(~xM )〉, and let Φ∗y,M represent its conju-
gate transpose. It was proven in [27] that the maximal
probability of correctly distinguishing between GU pure
states with equal a priori probabilities is given by the
smallest eigenvalue of Φy,MΦ
∗
y,M . The matrices Φy,M ,
with y ∈ {A,B} and M ≥ 3, can be written, respec-
tively, as
10
ΦA,M =
1√
pA,M
(
a
√
pA,M−1ΦA,M−1 a
√
pA,M−1ΦA,M−1
b
√
pB,M−1ΦB,M−1 −b√pB,M−1ΦB,M−1
)
,
ΦB,M =
1√
pB,M
(
a
√
pB,M−1ΦB,M−1 −a√pB,M−1ΦB,M−1
b
√
pA,M−1ΦA,M−1 b
√
pA,M−1ΦA,M−1
)
, (A2)
where Φy,M−1 denotes the matrix whose columns are the
state vectors |φy(~xM−1)〉 given by (12). This means, in
particular, that Φy,MΦ
∗
y,M can be expressed as a block-
diagonal matrix as
Φy,MΦ
∗
y,M =
1
py,M
(
2a2py,M−1Φy,M−1Φ
∗
y,M−1 0¯
0¯ 2b2py¯,M−1Φy¯,M−1Φ
∗
y¯,M−1
)
, (A3)
with 0¯ denoting a zero matrix, i.e., a matrix which con-
tains only zeros. The smallest eigenvalue of Φy,MΦ
∗
y,M ,
that we shall denote as λminy,M , is given by
λminy,M = min
{
2a2py,M−1λ
min
y,M−1
py,M
,
2b2py¯,M−1λ
min
y¯,M−1
py,M
}
,
(A4)
with λminy,M−1 denoting the smallest eigenvalue of
Φy,M−1Φ
∗
y,M−1. We solve (A4) by induction. In par-
ticular, we start by analyzing the case M = 2, and then
we show that
2a2py,M−1λ
min
y,M−1 ≥ 2b2py¯,M−1λminy¯,M−1, (A5)
for all M ≥ 3.
When M = 2, we have that ΦA,2Φ
∗
A,2 =
(pA,2)
−1[2a4, 0; 0, 2b4], and ΦB,2Φ
∗
B,2 =
(pB,2)
−1[2a2b2, 0; 0, 2a2b2]. Then, since a > b, it is
guaranteed that 2a4 = 2a2pA,1 > 2b
4 = 2b2pB,1,
and 2a2b2 = 2a2pB,1 = 2b
2pA,1, respectively. That
is, if we define λminy,1 = 1 for all y ∈ {A,B},
then (A5) is satisfied. When M = 3, it turns
out that 2a2pA,2λ
min
A,2 = 2b
2pB,2λ
min
B,2 = 4a
2b4,
and 2a2pB,2λ
min
B,2 = 4a
4b2 > 2b2pA,2λ
min
A,2 = 4b
6.
That is, (A5) is also satisfied. Let us now assume
that 2a2py,M−2λ
min
y,M−2 ≥ 2b2py¯,M−2λminy¯,M−2 is true.
Then, from (A4) we have that 2a2py,M−1λ
min
y,M−1 =
2a2min {2a2py,M−2λminy,M−2, 2b2py¯,M−2λminy¯,M−2} =
2a22b2py¯,M−2λ
min
y¯,M−2 ≥ 2b22b2py,M−2λminy,M−2 =
2b2py¯,M−1λ
min
y¯,M−1.
This means, therefore, that λminy,M is given by
λminy,M =
1
py,M
(
2b2py¯,M−1λ
min
y¯,M−1
)
= psucc,y,Mλ
min
y¯,M−1, (A6)
where in the last equality we have used (14). When M
is even, this expression can be written as
λminy,M =
M/2∏
i=1
psucc,y,2i
M/2−1∏
j=1
psucc,y¯,2j+1, (A7)
while, whenever M is odd then (A6) has the form
λminy,M =
(M−1)/2∏
i=1
psucc,y,2i+1psucc,y¯,2i. (A8)
The maximal probability of unambiguously determin-
ing all the relative phases contained in the signal states
ρ(~xM ) is given by
∑
y∈{A,B}
py,Mλ
min
y,M . (A9)
After some straightforward calculations, we obtain that
this quantity can be written as [1 − exp (−2µα)]M−1,
which coincides with that obtained in section IIIA.
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